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Abstract. We introduce a formalism modelling communication of dis-
tributed agents strictly in continuous-time. Within this framework, we
study the problem of synthesising local strategies for individual agents
such that a specified set of goal states is reached, or reached with at
least a given probability. The flow of time is modelled explicitly based
on continuous-time randomness, with two natural implications: First, the
non-determinism stemming from interleaving disappears. Second, when
we restrict to a subclass of non-urgent models, the quantitative value
problem for two players can be solved in EXPTIME. Indeed, the ex-
plicit continuous time enables players to communicate their states by
delaying synchronisation (which is unrestricted for non-urgent models).
In general, the problems are undecidable already for two players in the
quantitative case and three players in the qualitative case. The quali-
tative undecidability is shown by a reduction to decentralized POMDPs
for which we provide the strongest (and rather surprising) undecidability
result so far.
1 Introduction
Distributed self-organising and self-maintaining systems are posing interesting
design challenges, and have been subject to many practical [32] as well as theo-
retical [27, 28] investigations. Distributed systems interact in real time, and one
very general way to reason about their timing behaviour is to assume that ar-
bitrary continuous probability distributions govern the timing of local steps as
well as of communication steps. We are interested in how foundational proper-
ties of such distributed systems differ from models where timing is abstracted.
As principal means of communication we consider symmetric handshake com-
munication, since it can embed other forms of communication faithfully [2, 23]
including asynchronous and input/output-separated communication.
As an example, consider the problem of leaking a secret from a sandboxed
malware to an attacker. The behaviour of attacker and malware (and possibly
other components) are prescribed in terms of states, private transitions, labelled
synchronisation transitions, and delay transitions which model both local com-
putation times and synchronisation times. The delays are governed by arbitrary
continuous probability distributions over real time. Handshake synchronisation
is assumed to take place if all devices able to do so agree on the same transition
label. Otherwise the components run fully asynchronously. The sandboxing can
be thought of as restricting the set of labels allowed to occur on synchronisation
transitions. The question we focus on is how to synthesise the component control
strategies for malware and attacker so that they reach their target (of leaking
the secret) almost surely or with at least a given probability p.
More precisely, we consider a parallel composition of n modules synchro-
nizing via handshake communication. The modules are modelled by interactive
Markov chains (IMCs) [16, 17], a generalization of labelled transition systems
and of continuous time Markov chains, equipped with a well-understood compo-
sitional theory. Each module may in each state enable private actions, as well as
synchronisation actions. It is natural to view such a distributed IMC as a game
with n+1 players, where the last player controls the interleaving of the modules.
Each of the other n players controls the decisions in a single module, only based
on its local timed history containing only transitions that have occurred within
the module. On entering a state of its module, each player selects and commits
to executing one of the actions enabled. A private action is executed immediately
while a synchronisation action requires a CSP-style handshake [6], it is executed
once all modules able to perform this action have committed to it.
For representing delay distributions, we make one decisive and one technical
restriction. First, we assume that each distribution is continuous. This for in-
stance disallows deterministic delays of, say, 3 time units. It is an important sim-
plification assumed along our explorations of continuous-time distributed con-
trol. Second, we restrict to exponential distributions. This is a pure technicality,
since (a) our results can be developed with general continuous distributions,
at the price of excessive notational and technical overhead, and (b) exponen-
tial distributions can approximate arbitrary continuous distributions arbitrarily
close [24]. Together, these assumptions enable us to work in a setting close to
interactive Markov chains.
Apart from running in continuous time, the concepts behind distributed
IMCs are rather common. Closely related are models based on probabilistic au-
tomata [31] or (partially observable) Markov decision processes [3, 25]. In these
settings, the power of the interleaving player n + 1 is a matter of ongoing de-
bate [7, 8, 26]. The problem is that without additional (and often complicated)
assumptions this player is too powerful to be realistic, and can for instance leak
information between the other players. This is a problem, e.g. in the security
context, making model checking results overly pessimistic [13].
In sharp contrast to the discrete-time settings, in our distributed IMCs the
interleaving player n+1 does not have decisive influence on the resulting game.
The reason is that the interleaving player can only affect the order of transitions
between two delays, but neither which transitions are taken nor what the differ-
ent players observe. This is rooted in the common alphabet synchronisation and
especially the continuous-time nature of the game: the probability of two local
modules changing state at the same time instant is zero, except if synchronising.
Example 1. We consider the model displayed on the right where the delay tran-
sitions are labelled by some rate λ. It displays a very simplistic malicious App
trying to communicate a secret to an outside Attacker, despite being sandboxed.
Innocently looking action login, logout and lookup synchronise App and Att, while
the unlabelled transitions denote some private actions of the respective module.
App:
c0
t1 t2 t3 t4
b1 b2 b3 b4
λ
λ
λ λ
login
λ
lookup
logout
λλ λ
login
λ
lookup
logout
Att:
c¯1 c¯2 c¯3
t¯4
b¯4
λ
λ
login lookup
λ
λ
Initially, the App can only let time pass.
The Attacker player has no other choice
than committing to handshaking on action
login. A race of the delay transitions will
occur that at some point will lead to ei-
ther state (t1, c¯1) or (b1, c¯1), with equal
probability. Say in (t1, c¯1), the App player
can only commit to action login. The syn-
chronisation will happen immediately since
the Attacker is committed to login already,
leading to (t2, c¯2). Now the App player has either to commit to action lookup or
logout. The latter will induce a deadlock due to a mismatch in players’ commit-
ments. Instead assuming the earlier, the state synchronously and immediately
changes to (t3, c¯3). The Attacker player can now use its local timed history to
decide which of the private actions to pick. Whatever it chooses, an interleaving
of private actions of the two modules follows in zero time. Unless the reachability
condition considers transient states such as (t3, t¯4) where no time is spent, the
player resolving the interleaving has no influence on the outcome.
Now, assume the reachability condition is the state set {(t4, t¯4), (b4, b¯4)}.
This corresponds to the Attacker player correctly determining the initial race
of the App, and can be considered as a leaked secret. However, according to
the explanations provided, it should be obvious that the probability of guessing
correctly (by committing properly in state c¯3) is no larger than 0.5, just because
the players are bound to decide only based on the local history. The crucial
question is: is there an algorithm to compute such probabilities, in general?
Our contribution This paper is the first to explore distributed cooperative
reachability games with continuous-time flow modelled explicitly. The formalism
we study is based on interactive Markov chains, which in turn has been applied
across a wide range of engineering domains. We aim at synthesising local strate-
gies for the players to reach with at least a given probability a specified set of goal
states. If this probability is 1 we call the problem qualitative, otherwise quan-
titative. We consider existential problems, asking for the existence of strategies
with these properties, and value problems, asking for strategies approximating
the given probability value arbitrarily closely. We have three main results:
1. We show that, under mild assumptions on the winning condition, in continuous-
time distributed synthesis the interleaving player has no power.
2. In general, we establish that the quantitative problems are undecidable for
two or more players, the qualitative value problem is undecidable for two or
more players and the qualitative existence problem is EXPTIME-hard for
two players and undecidable for three or more players.
3. However, when focusing on the subclass of 2-player non-urgent distributed
IMCs, the quantitative value problem can be solved in exponential time.
Non-urgency enables changing the decisions committed to after some time.
Thus, it empowers the players to reach a distributed consensus about the
next handshake to perform by observing the only information they jointly
have access to: the advance of time.
The qualitative undecidability comes from a novel result about decentralised
partially observable Markov decision processes (DEC-POMDP), a multi-player
extensions of POMDP. While qualitative existence is decidable for POMDP [1],
we show that qualitative existence is undecidable for DEC-POMDP already for
2 players. It is to the knowledge of the authors the strongest undecidability
result for DEC-POMDPs with infinite horizon which is of its own interest. By a
reduction from DEC-POMDP to distributed IMCs that adds one player, we get
undecidability of qualitative existence for 3 or more players in distributed IMCs.
2 Distributed Interactive Markov Chains
We denote by R, R≥0, N, and N0 the sets of real numbers, non-negative real
numbers, positive integers, and non-negative integers, respectively. Furthermore,
for a finite set X , we denote by ∆(X) the set of discrete probability distributions
over X , i.e. functions f : X → [0, 1] such that
∑
x∈X f(x) = 1. Finally, for a
tuple x from a product space X1×· · ·×Xn and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we use functional
notation x(i) to denote the ith element of the tuple.
We first give a definition of a (local) module based on the formalism of
Interactive Markov Chains (IMC). Then we introduce (global) distributed IMC.
Definition 1 (IMC) An IMC (module) is a tuple (S,Act, →֒, , sin) where
– S is a finite set of states with an initial state sin,
– Act is a finite set of actions,
– →֒ ⊆ S ×Act× S is the action transition relation,
–  ⊆ S ×Q>0 × S is the finite delay transition relation.
We write s
a
→֒ s′ when (s, a, s′) ∈ →֒ and s
λ
 s′ when (s, λ, s′) ∈ (λ being the
rate of the transition). We say that action a is available in s if s
a→֒ s′ for some s′.
Definition 2 (Distributed IMC) A distributed IMC is a tuple
G = ((Si,Acti, →֒i, i, s
in
i ))1≤i≤n
of modules for players Plr = {1, ..., n}. Furthermore, by Act =
⋃
i Acti we denote
the set of all actions, and by S = S1 × ...× Sn the set of (global) states.
Intuitively, a distributed IMC moves in continuous-time from a (global) state
to a (global) state using transitions with labels from Label = Act ∪ Plr:
– An action transition with label a ∈ Act corresponds to synchronous commu-
nication of all players in Sync(a) := {j ∈ Plr | a ∈ Actj} and can only be
taken when it is enabled, i.e. when all these players choose their local tran-
sitions with action a at the same time. It is called a synchronisation action
if |Sync(a)| ≥ 2 and a private action if |Sync(a)| = 1.
– A delay transition of any player j ∈ Plr is taken independently by the player
after a random delay, i.e. the set of players that synchronise over label j is
Sync(j) = {j}.
Formally, the (local) choices of player j range over Cj = →֒j ∪{⊥}. When in
(local) state s, the player may pick only a choice available in s. That is, either
an action transition of the form s
a→֒ s′ or ⊥ if there is no such action transition.
We define global choices as C = C1 × · · · × Cn. A global choice c induces the set
En(c) = {a ∈ Act | ∀j ∈ Sync(a) : c(j) = (·, a, ·)} of actions enabled in c.
To avoid that time stops by taking infinitely many action steps in zero time,
we pose a standard assumption prohibiting cycles [14,15,18–20]: we require that
for every action a ∈ Act there is a player j ∈ Sync(a) such that the labelled
transition system (Sj , →֒j) does not have any cycle involving action a.
The behaviour of a distributed IMC is a play, an infinite sequence
ρ = s0c0
a1,t1
−−−→ s1c1
a2,t2
−−−→ s2c2 · · ·
where each si ∈ S is the state after i moves, ci ∈ C is the choice of the players
in the state si, and ai+1 ∈ Label and ti+1 ∈ R≥0 are the label and the absolute
time of the next transition taken. By Play we denote the set of all plays. Which
play is taken depends on the strategies of the players, on the scheduler which
resolves interleaving of communication whenever multiple actions are enabled,
and on the rules (involving randomness) given later.
2.1 Schedulers and strategies
First we define strategies and schedulers basing their decision on the current
local and global history, respectively. A (global) history is a finite prefix
h = s0c0
a1,t1
−−−→ · · ·
ai,ti
−−−→ si
of a play ending with a state. For given h, we get the local history of player j as
πj(h) = s
′
0(j)c
′
0(j)
a′1,t
′
1−−−→ · · ·
a′ℓ,t
′
ℓ−−−→ s
′
ℓ
(j)
where s′0c
′
0
a′1,t
′
1−−−→ · · ·
a′ℓ,t
′
ℓ−−−→ s
′
ℓ
is the subsequence of h omitting all steps not
visible for player j, i.e. all am,tm−−−−→ smcm with j 6∈ Sync(am). The set of all
global histories is denoted by Hist; the set of local histories of player j by Histj .
Example 2. Consider again Example 1. Let App be controlled by player 1 and
Att by player 2. For the following history we get corresponding local histories
h = (c0, c¯1)(⊥, login)
1,0.42
−−−−→ (t1, c¯1)(login, login)
login,0.42
−−−−−−→ (t2, c¯2),
π1(h) = c0 ⊥
1,0.42
−−−−→ t1 login
login,0.42
−−−−−−→ t2, π2(h) = c¯1 login
login,0.42
−−−−−−→ c¯2
Note that the attacker can neither observe the Markovian transition nor the
local state of the App. The App cannot observe the local state of the attacker
either, but it can be deduced from the local history of the App.
A strategy for player j is a measurable function σ : Histj → ∆(Cj) that
assigns to any local history h of player j a probability distribution over choices
available in the last state of h. We say that a strategy σ for player j is pure if
for all h we have σ(h)(c) = 1 for some c; and memoryless if for all h and h′ with
equal last local state we have σ(h) = σ(h′).
A scheduler is a measurable function δ : Hist×C → ∆(Act)∪{⊥} that assigns
to any global history h and global choice c a probability distribution over actions
enabled in c; or a special symbol ⊥ again denoting that no action is enabled.
Example 3. The available local choices in (t2, c¯2), the last state of h from above,
are {(t2, lookup, t3), (t2, logout , t1)} for App and solely {(c¯2, lookup, c¯3)} for Att.
Let the strategy of App select either choice with equal probability. If (t2, lookup, t3)
is chosen, lookup is enabled and must be picked by the scheduler σ. If (t2, logout , t1)
is chosen, no action is enabled and δ must pick ⊥, waiting for a delay transition.
2.2 Probability of plays
Let us fix a profile of strategies σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) for individual players, and a
scheduler δ. The play starts in the initial state s0 = (s
in
1 , . . . , s
in
n ) and inductively
evolves as follows. Let the current history be h = s0c0
a1,t1
−−−→ · · ·
ai,ti
−−−→ si.
– For the next choice ci, only players Pi := Sync(ai) involved in the last
transition freely choose (we assume P0 := Plr). Hence, independently for
every j ∈ Pi, the choice ci(j) is taken randomly according to σj(πj(h)). All
remaining players j 6∈ Pi stick to the previous choice ci(j) = ci−1(j) as for
them, no observable event happened.
– After fixing ci, there are two types of transitions:
1. If En(ci) 6= ∅, the next synchronization action ai+1 ∈ En(ci) is chosen
randomly according to δ(h, ci) and taken immediately at time ti+1 := ti.
The next state si+1 satisfies for every j ∈ Plr:
si+1(j) =
{
target(ci(j)) if j ∈ Sync(ai+1),
si(j) if j 6∈ Sync(ai+1).
where target(ci(j)) denotes the target of the transition chosen by player
j. In other words, players involved in synchronisation move according to
their choice, the remaining players stay in their previous states.
2. If En(ci) = ∅, a local delay transition is taken after a random delay,
chosen as follows. Each delay transition si(j)
λ
 · outgoing from the cur-
rent local state of any player j is assigned randomly a real-valued delay
according to the exponential distribution with rate λ. This results in a
collection of real numbers. The transition si(ℓ)
λ
 s with the minimum
delay d in this collection is taken. Hence, ai+1 := ℓ (denoting that player
ℓmoves), ti+1 := ti+d, and the next state si+1 satisfies for every j ∈ Plr:
si+1(j) =
{
s if j ∈ Sync(ai+1) = {ℓ},
si(j) if j 6∈ Sync(ai+1).
All these rules induce a probability measure Prσ,δ over the set of all plays by a
standard cylinder construction.
2.3 Distributed synthesis problem
We study the following two fundamental reachability problems for distributed
IMCs. Let G be a distributed IMC, T ⊆ S be a target set of states, and p be a
rational number in [0, 1]. Denoting by ⋄T the set of plays ρ that reach a state in
T and stay there for a non-zero amount of time, we focus on:
Existence Does there exist a strategy profile σ s.t. for all schedulers δ,
Prσ,δ(⋄T ) ≥ p ?
Value Can the value p be arbitrarily approached, i.e. do we have
sup
σ
inf
δ
Prσ,δ(⋄T ) ≥ p ?
We refer to the general problem with p ∈ [0, 1] as quantitative. When we restrict
to p = 1, we call the problem qualitative.
3 Schedulers are not that powerful
The task of a scheduler is to choose among concurrently enabled transitions,
thereby resolving the non-determinism conceptually caused by interleaving. In
this section, we address the impact of the decisions of the scheduler. We show
that despite having the ability to affect the order in which transitions are taken
in the global play, the scheduler cannot affect what every player observes locally.
Thus, the scheduler affects neither the choices of any player nor what synchro-
nisation occurs. As a result, for winning objectives that are closed under local
observation equivalence, the scheduler cannot affect the probability of winning.
•
s0
s1
s2
s3
•
t0
t1
t2
•
u0
u1
•
v0
v1
C1 C2 C3 C4
λ
a
b
a
c
b c
Example 4. Consider the distributed IMC to the
right. After the delay transition is taken in C1 and
there is synchronisation on action a, the scheduler
can choose whether there will be synchronisation
on b or c first. However, it can only affect the
interleaving, not any of the local plays.
For a play ρ = s0c0
a1,t1
−−−→ s1c1
a2,t2
−−−→ s2c2 · · · we define the local play πj(ρ)
of player j analogously to local histories. We define local observation equivalence
∼ over plays by setting ρ ∼ ρ′ if πj(ρ) = πj(ρ
′) for all j ∈ Plr. Let us stress that
two local observation equivalent plays have exactly the same action and delay
transitions happening at the same moments of time; only the order of action
transitions happening at the same time can differ. Finally, we say that a set E
of plays is closed under local observation equivalence if for any ρ ∈ E and any ρ′
such that ρ ∼ ρ′ we have ρ′ ∈ E. It is now possible to show the following.
Theorem 1 Let E be a measurable set of plays closed under local observation
equivalence. For any strategy profile σ and schedulers δ and δ′ we have
Prσ,δ(E) = Prσ,δ
′
(E).
As a result, for the rest of the paper we write Prσ(E) instead of Prσ,δ(E) since
the scheduler cannot affect the probability of the events we consider. Indeed, the
reachability objectives defined in the previous section are closed under local
observation equivalence.
Remark 1. The fact that interleaving does not have decisive impact in continuous
time may seem natural and thus possibly unsurprising to experts. Yet, the result
does not hold for many small variations of the setting we consider, e.g. neither
for asymmetric communication nor when allowing cycles of action transitions.
4 Undecidability Results
In this section, we put distributed IMCs into context of other partial-observation
models. As a result, we show that reachability quickly gets undecidable here.
Theorem 2 For distributed IMCs we have that
1. the qualitative value, quantitative value, and quantitative existence problems
are undecidable with n ≥ 2 players; and
2. the qualitative existence problem is ExpTime-hard with n = 2 players and
undecidable with n ≥ 3 players.
Theorem 2 is obtained by using two fundamental results. First, we provide
a novel (and somewhat surprising) result for decentralized POMDPs (DEC-
POMDPs) [3], an established multi-player generalization of POMDPs. We show
that the qualitative existence problem for DEC-POMDPs is undecidable al-
ready for 2 players. This is, to the knowledge of the authors, currently the
strongest known undecidability result for DEC-POMDPs. Second, we show that
distributed IMCs are not only more expressive (w.r.t. reachability) than POMDPs
but also more expressive than DEC-POMDPs. We show it by reducing reacha-
bility in DEC-POMDPs with n players to reachability in distributed IMCs with
n+1 players. Theorem 2 follows from these two results and from known results
about POMDPs [4, 12, 25]. For an overview, see Table 1.
POMDPs DEC-POMDPs Distributed IMCs
Qual. Existence Dec. [1] Undec. for ≥ 2 players Undec. for ≥ 3 players
Value Undec. [12] Undec. for ≥ 1 player [12] Undec. for ≥ 2 players
Quant. Existence Undec. [25] Undec. for ≥ 1 player [25] Undec. for ≥ 2 players
Value Undec. [4] Undec. for ≥ 1 player [4] Undec. for ≥ 2 players
Table 1: Undecidability results for reachability. Unreferenced results are shown
here.
4.1 Decentralized POMDP (DEC-POMDP)
We start with a definition of the related formalism of decentralized POMDP [3].
Definition 3 A DEC-POMDP is a tuple (S,Plr, (Acti,Oi)1≤i≤n, P,O, sin) where
– S is a finite set of global states with initial state sin ∈ S,
– Plr = {1, ..., n} is a finite set of players,
– Acti is a finite set of local actions of player i with Acti ∩ Actj = ∅ if j 6= i,
(by Act = Act1 × · · · ×Actn we denote the set of global actions),
– Oi is a finite set of local observations for player i,
(by O = O1 × · · · × On we denote the set of global observations),
– P : S × Act → ∆(S) is the transition function which assigns to a state and
a global action a probability distribution over successor states, and
– O : S ×Act× S → ∆(O) is the observation function which assigns to every
transition a probability distribution over global observations.
In contrast to distributed IMCs that capture flow of time explicitly, DEC-
POMDP is a discrete-time formalism. A DEC-POMDP starts in the initial state
sin. Assuming that the current state is s, one discrete step of the process works
as follows. First, each player j chooses an action aj. Then the next state s
′ is
chosen according to the probability distribution P (s,a) where a = (a1, . . . , an).
Then, each player j receives an observation oj ∈ Oj such that the observations
o = (o1, ..., on) are chosen with probability O(s,a, s
′)(o). Repeating this forever,
we obtain a play which is an infinite sequence ρ = s0a0o0s1a1o1 · · · where
s0 = s
in and for all i ≥ 0 it holds that si ∈ S, ai ∈ Act, and oi ∈ O. Note that
the players can only base their decisions on the sequences of observations they
receive rather than the actual sequence of states which is not available to them.
For a more complete coverage of DEC-POMDPs, see [3].
4.2 Reduction from DEC-POMDP
First we present the reduction from a DEC-POMDP P to a distributed IMC G.
In this subsection, we write PrσP or Pr
σ
G instead of Pr
σ to distinguish between
the probability measure in the DEC-POMDP from the probability measure in
the distributed IMC.
Proposition 1 For a DEC-POMDP P with n players and a target set T of
states of P we can construct in polynomial time a distributed IMC G with n+1
players and a target set T ′ of global states in G where:
∃σ : PrσG (⋄T ) = p ⇐⇒ ∃σ
′ : Prσ
′
P (⋄T
′) = p.
Proof (Proof sketch). Let us fix n and P = (S,Plr, (Acti)1≤i≤n, δ, (Oi)1≤i≤n, O)
where Plr = {1, ..., n}. Further, let Acti = {ai1, ..., aimi} and Oi = {oi1, ..., oiℓi}
for player i ∈ Plr. The distributed IMC G has n + 1 modules, one module for
each player in P and the main module responsible for their synchronisation.
Intuitively,
– the module of every player i stores the last local observation in its state
space. Every step of P is modelled as follows: The player outputs to the
main module the action it chooses and then inputs from the main module
the next observation.
– The main module stores the global state in its state space. Every step of P
corresponds to the following: The main module inputs the actions of all play-
ers one by one, then it randomly picks the new state and new observations
according to the rules of P based on the actions collected. The observations
are lastly output to all players, again one by one.
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Fig. 1: Module for player i on the left. Input and output encoding to the right.
We construct the distributed IMC so that only the outputting player chooses
what action to output whereas the inputting player accepts whatever comes.
The construction of modules for player i is illustrated in Figure 1 along with
constructions for input and output. The interesting part is how an action from
the set {a1, . . . , ar} is input in a state s. Instead of waiting in s, the player
travels by delay transitions in a round-robin fashion through a cycle of r states,
where in the i-th state, only the action ai is available. Thus, the player has no
influence and must input the action that comes. By this construction, the main
module has at most one action transition in every state such that the player
cannot influence anything; other modules get no insight by observing time and
thus the players have the same power as in the DEC-POMDP. ⊓⊔
4.3 Undecidability of qualitative existence in DEC-POMDP
Next, we show that the qualitative existence problem for DEC-POMDPs even
with n ≥ 2 players is undecidable. The proof has similarities with ideas from [5]
where it is shown that deciding existence of sure-winning strategies in safety
games with 3 players and partial observation is undecidable. Using the ran-
domness of DEC-POMDPs we show undecidability of the qualitative existence
problem for reachability in 2-player DEC-POMDPs.
s0
s1
s2
s3
s4
P ′ P ′′
P ′′′
(n, n)
1
3
1
3
1
3
(n, n)
1
3
1
3
1
3
Fig. 2: Overall structure of P without details of P ′,P ′′ and P ′′′.
Theorem 3 It is undecidable whether for a DEC-POMDP P with n ≥ 2 players
and a set T of target states in P if there exists a strategy profile σ such that
PrσP(⋄T ) = 1.
Proof (Proof sketch). We do a reduction from the non-halting problem of a
deterministic Turing machine M that starts with a blank input tape. From M
we construct a DEC-POMDP P with two players Plr = {1, 2} such that M does
not halt if and only if players 1 and 2 have strategies σ = (σ1, σ2) which ensure
that the probability of reaching a target set T is 1. Figure 2 shows the overall
structure of P without details of sub-modules P ′,P ′′ and P ′′′.
Both players have two possible observations, black and white. We depict the
observation of player 1 in the top-half and of player 2 in the bottom-half of
every state. The play starts in s0 and with probability 1, every player receives
the black observation exactly once during the play. If the play goes to s1 or s4
the players will receive the observation at the same time and if the play goes to
s3 then player 2 will receive the observation in the step after player 1 does. The
modules P ′,P ′′ and P ′′′ are designed so that:
– In P ′, a target state is reached if and only if the sequence of actions played
by both players encodes the initial configuration of M .
– In P ′′, a target state is reached with probability 1 if and only if both players
play the same infinite sequence of actions. Note that randomness is essential
to build such a module.
– In P ′′′, the target set is reached if and only if the sequences of actions played
by player 1 and 2 encode two configurations C1 and C2 of M , respectively,
such that C1 is not an accepting configuration and C2 is a successor config-
uration of C1. This can be done since a finite automaton can be constructed
that recognizes if one configuration is a successor of the other when reading
both configurations at the same time. Note that it is possible because such
configurations can only differ by a constant amount (the control state, the
tape head position and in symbols in cells near the tape head).
It can be shown by induction that if there are strategies σ1, σ2 that ensure
reaching T with probability 1 then every σi has to play the encoding of the jth
configuration ofM when it receives the black observation in the jth step. Further,
it can be shown that these strategies do ensure reaching T with probability 1 if
M does not halt on the empty input tape and do not ensure reaching T with
probability 1 if M halts. ⊓⊔
5 Decidability for non-urgent models
In this section, we turn our attention to a subclass of distributed IMCs, called
non-urgent, that implies decidability for both the qualitative and quantitative
value problems for 2 players.
Definition 4 We call G = ((Si,Acti, →֒i, i, s0i))1≤i≤n non-urgent if for every
1 ≤ j ≤ n:
1. Every s ∈ Sj is of one of the following forms:
(a) Synchronisation state with at least one outgoing synchronisation action
transition and exactly one outgoing delay transition which is a self-loop.
(b) Private state with arbitrary outgoing delay transitions and private action
transitions.
2. Player j has an action ∅j ∈ Actj enabled in every synchronisation state
from Sj that allows to “do nothing” and thus postpone the synchronisation.
To this end, ∅j is also in Actk for every other player k 6= j but ∅j does not
appear in →֒k. As a result, j does not take part in any synchronisation while
choosing ∅j.
In a non-urgent distributed IMC, s ∈ S is called a (global) synchronisation
state if it is the initial state or all s(j) are synchronisation states. We denote
global synchronisation states by S′. All other global states S \ S′ are called
private.
Example 5. Consider the non-urgent variant of Example 1 on the right. The
“do nothing” actions are a natural concept; the only real modelling restriction is
that one cannot model a communication time-out any more, the delay transitions
from synchronisation states need to be self-loops.
App:
c0
t1 t2 t3 t4
b1 b2 b3 b4
λ
λ
λ λ λ
∅1 ∅1
login lookup
λ λ λ
∅1 ∅1
login lookup
Att:
c¯1 c¯2 c¯3
t¯4
b¯4
λ λ
∅2 ∅2
login lookup
λ
λ
Surprisingly, in this model, the secret can
be leaked with probability 1 as follows. As
before, the players reach the states (t2, c¯2) or
(b2, c¯2) with equal probability. Now, the App
player can arbitrarily postpone the lookup
by committing to action ∅1. Whenever the
delay self-loop is taken, the player can re-
decide to perform lookup. Since the self-loop
is taken repetitively, the App player is flex-
ible in choosing the timing of lookup. Thus,
leaking the secret is simple, e.g. by perform-
ing lookup in an odd second when in t2 and in an even second when in b2.
For two players, we construct a general synchronisation scheme that (highly
probably) shows the players the current global state after each communication.
Theorem 4 The quantitative value problem for 2-player non-urgent distributed
IMCs where the target set consists only of synchronisation states is in ExpTime.
Being a special case, also the qualitative value problem is decidable. In
essence, the problem becomes decidable because in the synchronisation states,
the players can effectively exchange arbitrary information. This resembles the
setting of [11]. The insight that observing global time provides an additional
synchronization mechanism is not novel in itself, but it is obviously burdensome
to formally capture in time-abstract models of asynchronous communication,
and thus usually not considered. For distributed IMC, it still is non-trivial to
develop; here it hinges on the non-urgency assumption. The results of [11] also
indicate that for three or more players, additional constraints on the topology
may be needed to obtain decidability.
In the rest of the section we prove Theorem 4, fixing a 2-player non-urgent
distributed IMC G = ((Si,Acti, →֒i, i, s0i))1≤i≤2, p ∈ [0, 1], and T ⊆ S
′. We
present the algorithm based on a reduction to a discrete-time Markov decision
process and then discuss its correctness.
Markov decision process (MDP) An MDP is a tuple M = (S,A, P, s0) where S
is a finite set of states, A is a finite set of actions, P : S×A→ ∆(S) is a partial
probabilistic transition function, and s0 is an initial state. An MDP is the special
case of a DEC-POMDP with 1 player that has a unique observation for each
state. A play inM is a sequence ω = s0s1 . . . of states such that P (si, ai)(si+1) >
0 for some action ai for every i ≥ 0. A history is a prefix of a play. A strategy
is a function π that to every history h · s assigns a probability distribution over
actions such that if an action a is assigned a non-zero probability, then P (s, a)
is defined. A strategy π is pure memoryless if it assigns Dirac distributions to
any history and its choice depends only on the last state of the history. When
we fix a strategy π, we obtain a probability measure Prπ over the set of plays.
For further details, see [29].
The algorithm It works by reduction to an MDP MG = (S′, A, P, s0) where
– S′ ⊆ S is the set of global synchronisation states;
– A = C ×Σ1×Σ2 ∪ {⊥} where Σj is the set of pure memoryless strategies of
player j in G that choose ∅j in every synchronisation state;
– For an arbitrary state (s1, s2), we define the transition function as follows:
• For any (c, σ1, σ2) ∈ A, the transition P ((s1, s2), (c, σ1, σ2)) is defined if
c is available in (s1, s2) and the players agree in c on some action a, i.e.
En(c) = {a}. If defined, the distribution P ((s1, s2), (c, σ1, σ2)) assigns
to any successor state (s′1, s
′
2) the probability that in G the state (s
′
1, s
′
2)
is reached from (s1, s2) via states in S \S′ by choosing c and then using
the pure memoryless strategy profile (σ1, σ2).
• To avoid deadlocks, the transition P ((s1, s2),⊥) is defined iff no other
transition is defined in (s1, s2) and it is a self-loop, i.e. it assigns proba-
bility 1 to (s1, s2).
The MDP MG has size exponential in |G|. Note that all target states T are
included in S′. Slightly abusing notation, let ⋄T denote the set of plays in MG
that reach the set T . From standard results on MDPs [29], there exists an optimal
pure memoryless strategy π∗, i.e. a strategy satisfying Prπ
∗
(⋄T ) = supπ Pr
π(⋄T ).
Furthermore, such a strategy π∗ and the value v := Prπ
∗
(⋄T ) can be computed
in time polynomial in |MG |. Finally, the algorithm returns TRUE if v ≥ p and
FALSE, otherwise.
Correctness of the algorithm Let us explain why the approach is correct.
Proposition 2 The value of G is equal to the value of MG, i.e.
sup
σ
Prσ(⋄T ) = sup
π
Prπ(⋄T ).
Proof sketch. As regards the ≤ inequality, it suffices to show that any strategy
profile σ can be mimicked by some strategy π. This is simple as π in MG has
always knowledge of the global state. Much more interesting is the ≥ inequality.
We argue that for any strategy π there is a sequence of local strategy profiles
σ
1,σ2, . . . such that
lim
i→∞
Prσ
i
(⋄T ) = Prπ(⋄T ). S′2
1 2
sync ¬sync sync ¬sync
S′1
1
2
3
∅1
c2(1, 1)
∅1
c2(2, 1)
c1(3, 1)
c2(3, 1)
c1(3, 2)
∅2
∅1
∅2
∅1
∅2
The crucial idea is that a strategy profile
communicates correctly (with high probabil-
ity) the current global state in a synchroni-
sation state by delaying as follows. The time
is divided into phases, each of |S′1|·2|S
′
2| slots
(where S′i are the synchronisation states of
player i). We depict a phase by the table on
the right where the time flows from top to
bottom and from left to right (as reading a
book). Players 1 and 2 try to synchronise in
the row and column, respectively, corresponding to their current states (in circle)
and in each slot take the choice ci(s1, s2) optimal given the current global state
is (s1, s2); in the remaining slots they choose to do nothing. Since the players
can change their choice only at random moments of time, their synchronising
choice always stretches a bit into the successive silent slot (in a ¬sync column).
The more we increase the size of each slot, the lower is the chance that a syn-
chronisation choice of a player stretches to the next synchronisation slot. Thus,
the lower is the chance of an erroneous synchronisation. We define the size of
the slot to increase with i and also along the play so that for any fixed i the
probability of at least one erroneous synchronisation is bounded by κi < 1 and
for i→∞, we have κi → 0. ⊓⊔
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has introduced a foundational framework for modelling and syn-
thesising distributed controllers interacting in continuous time via handshake
communication. The continuous time nature of the model induces that the in-
terleaving scheduler has in fact very little power. We studied cooperative reacha-
bility problems for which we presented a number of undecidability results, while
for non-urgent models we established decidability of both quantitative and qual-
itative problems for the two-player case. In the framework considered, the re-
striction to exponential distributions is a technical vehicle, the results could have
been developed in general continuous time, e.g. by using the model of stochastic
automata [9].
Distributed IMCs can be considered as an attractive base model especially
in the context of information flow and other security-related studies. This is
because in contrast to the discrete time setting, the power of the interleaving
scheduler is no matter of debate, it can leak no essential information.
From a more general perspective, distributed synthesis of control algorithms
has received considerable attention in its entirety [21, 27, 28]. The asynchronous
setting with handshake synchronisation has been considered in [22]. Notably,
our assumption that players stay committed to a particular action choice for the
time in between state changes implies the necessity to let the players explicitly
solve distributed consensus problems. As done in [22], one can overcome this by
letting local players pick sets of enabled actions (or letting them change choice
with infinite speed), and then let some built-in magic pick a valid action from
the intersection, implying that whenever possible a consensus is reached for sure.
Such a change would however reintroduce the scheduler.
We should point out that distributed IMCs are not fully compositional:
We are assuming a fixed vector of modules, and do not discuss that modules
themselves may be vectors. Otherwise, we would face the phenomenon of auto-
concurrency [10], where transitions with identical synchronisation actions might
get enabled concurrently, despite not synchronising. This in turn would again
re-introduce distinguishing power of the scheduler.
Distributed Markov chains [30] constitute another recent discrete-time ap-
proach where interleaving nondeterminism is tamed successfully via assumptions
on the communication structure. The observation that continuous time reduces
the power of the interleaving scheduler is not entirely new. Though not explic-
itly discussed, it underpins the model of probabilistic I/O automata (PIOA) [33]
which uses I/O communication with input-enabledness and output-determinism.
In that setting, output-determinism implies that local players have no decisive
power, and hence a continuous time Markov chain arises. We can approximate
I/O-based communication by distributed IMCs without the need for output-
determinism. The approximation is linked to arbitrarily small but non-zero de-
lays needed to cycle through synchronising action sets. A profound investigation
of the continuous-time particularities of this and other synchronisation disci-
plines is considered an interesting topic for future work.
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A Definition of the probability measure
First, we pose an assumption on the module of each player j to avoid that a play
stops because no further steps are possible.
Assumption 1 We assume that every state has at least one outgoing delay tran-
sition or it only has outgoing private action transitions (that cannot be blocked
by other modules).
This is no real restriction: for states without any transition, we can add a delay
self-loop; states with synchronisation transitions are transformed as depicted
in Figure 3. Note that in the second case, simply adding delay self-loops would
change the behaviour because taking a delay self-loop allows the player to change
the choice.
As common for continuous-time systems, the definition is based on cylin-
der sets generated from interval-timed histories. An interval-timed history is a
sequence
H = s0c0
a1,I1
−−−→ s1c1 · · ·
ak,Ik−−−→ sk
where each Ii+1 is a real interval bounding the time spent waiting in si. We
further require that Ii = [0, 0] whenever ai ∈ Act and that the set of histories that
conform to H is non-empty. We say that a history s0c0
a1,t1
−−−→ s1c1 · · ·
ak,tk−−−→ sk
conforms to H if ti − ti−1 ∈ Ii for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k (where t0 = 0).
Slightly abusing notation, we interpret an interval-timed history H also as
the set of histories that conform to H . We define the cylinder Cyl(H) = {ρ ∈
Play | ∃i.ρ≤i ∈ H} as the set of plays which have a prefix in H . We define the
measurable spaces (Play,F) and (Hist,H) where F and H are the σ-algebra
generated from all cylinders and interval-timed histories, respectively:
F = σ ({Cyl(H) | H is an interval-timed history})
H = σ ({H | H is an interval-timed history})
Analogously, we can define measurable spaces (Histj ,Hj) over local histories (by
allowing also Ii for action transitions to have non-zero length).
For a given strategy profile σ, i.e. a tuple of strategies σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) of
individual players, a given scheduler δ and initial state s0, we obtain a purely
s0
s1
...
sn
s0
s1
...
sn
...
a1 an b1 bn
a1 an
λ λ
Fig. 3: Transformation for states with synchronisation transitions that adds new
private actions b1, . . . , bn.
stochastic process and we can define a probability measure Prσ,δ
s0
over Play. The
probability measure is uniquely determined by fixing probabilities for cylinder
sets Cyl(H) for any interval-timed history
H = s0c0
a1,I1
−−−→ s1c1 · · ·
ak,Ik−−−→ sk.
Let α1, ..., αv be the indices of delay transitions, i.e. for each αj we have aαj ∈
Plr; and β1, ..., βu be the indices of action transitions, i.e. for each βj we have
aβj ∈ Act. For 1 ≤ i ≤ v, let ℓi = inf(Iαi) and ui = sup(Iαi). Then Pr
σ,δ
s0
(Cyl(H))
is defined as∫ u1
ℓ1
...
∫ uv
ℓv
∏
1≤i≤v
Deαi(di) ·
∏
0≤i<k
Sti ·
∏
1≤i≤u
Scβi ddv · · ·dd1
where the terms Dei(d), Sci, and Sti express the contribution of the ith transi-
tion to the overall probability caused by the delays, decisions of the scheduler,
and decision on the strategies, respectively (see below). The variables di denote
the delay at ith delay transitions and induce a history
h = s0c0
a1,t1
−−−→ s1c1 · · ·
ak,tk−−−→ sk
such that ti =
∑
ℓ,αℓ≤i
dαℓ . Finally, we set
Dei(d) = Q(si, si+1) · e
−E(si)d,
where Q(s, s′) =
∑
s
λ,j
 s
′
λ and E(s) =
∑
s′ 6=sQ(s, s
′), and
Sti =
∏
j∈Sync(ai)
σj(πj(h≤i))(ci(j)),
Sci = δ(h≤i−1, ci−1)(ai).
When s′0 6= s0 then Pr
σ,δ
s
′
0
(CylG(H)) = 0.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Before we prove Theorem 1 we need a few definitions and lemmas.
For an interval-timed history let πj(H) = {πj(ρ) ∈ Play | ρ conforms to H}.
Further, Let ∼ be an equivalence relation on interval-timed histories defined
such that H ∼ H ′ for two interval-timed histories H and H ′ if and only if
πj(H) = πj(H
′) for every j ∈ Plr. We write [H ] for the set of histories h such
that there exists H ′ ∼ H with h ∈ H ′.
Now, for an interval-timed history H = s0c0
a1,I1
−−−→ s1c1 · · ·
ak,Ik−−−→ sk such
that the last action ak ∈ Plr if k > 0 we define the interleaving-abstract cylinder
as the set of plays with a prefix conforming to interval-timed historiesH ′ assuring
H ∼ H ′:
Cylia(H) = {ρ ∈ Play | ρ≤k ∈ [H ]}
Note that the interleaving-abstract cylinders are contained in the σ-algebra F
generated by the cylinder sets. We can therefore define a sub-σ-algebra I of F
generated by interleaving-abstract cylinders
I = σ({Cylia(H) |H is an interval-timed history
s.t. the last action is not in Act})
Since this is a sub-σ-algebra of F it inherits the probability measures defined
earlier restricted to I. Note that interleaving-abstract events are also 0-time
abstract. That is, they are events which are invariant under reordering of 0-time
interactions. Indeed, if no player can distinguish two histories h and h′, then the
delay transitions must be the same in the two histories. Further, since all players
have access to global time it must be the same actions that are performed in h
and h′ in every 0-duration sub-history Now, the only way in which h and h′ can
differ is in the interleaving of these 0-duration subhistories.
Lemma 1 Let σ = (σ1, ..., σn) be a pure strategy profile and let δ, δ
′ be two
schedulers. Further, let H = s0c0
a1,I1
−−−→ s1c1 · · ·
ak,Ik−−−→ sk be an interval-timed
history such that ai ∈ Act for all 1 ≤ i < k and ak ∈ Plr. Then
Prσ,δs0 (Cyl
ia(H)) = Prσ,δ
′
s0
(Cylia(H))
Further, this probability is either 0 or 1.
Proof. First note that before a delay transition happens there can be no loops
in any of the local histories πj(H). When we restrict to histories up to the first
delay transition, a pure strategy for player j can be considered to be simply a
maximal sequence (aj1, s
j
1)...(a
j
ℓj
, sjℓj ) of choices of player j. This is because for
any strategy σj of player j, the j-play moves along the unique path in the module
of player j that is chosen by player j at each step. The only thing player j can
observe is whether the transition (that he chose) is taken or not.
Assume now that we have a pure strategy profile σ = (σ1, ..., σn). This in-
duces such a sequence of choices for each player. The longest possible j-play that
can occur under σ before the first delay transition is ρj = s0(j)(a
j
1, s
j
1),
aj1,0−−→
sj1...
aj
ℓj
,0
−−−→ s
j
ℓj
. Further, all possible j-plays are prefixes of ρj . We now suppose
for contradiction that there are two histories h, h′ consistent with σ ending after
the first delay transition such that there exists a player j with |πj(h)| 6= |πj(h′)|.
Since πj(h) and πj(h
′) are both prefixes of ρj either πj(h) is a proper prefix of
πj(h
′) or the other way around. Without loss of generality let u = |πj(h)| <
|πj(h′)|.
Suppose σj(πj(h)) = (b0, s). Now, player j has not been able to synchronize
on b0 ∈ Act in the last state of h. However, he has been able to synchronize on it
along h′ due to different choices of the scheduler. Note that at earlier points on h
he might have synchronized on b0 a number of times already. Let this number of
times be c0 ∈ N. This means that all players capable of synchronizing on b0 must
have done so exactly c0 times along h. At least one of these players, let us call
him j1, must have stopped before committing to synchronize on b0 the (c0+1)th
time, because otherwise the play would have progressed since no action can be
enabled when a delay transition takes place. Note that each of these players are
willing to perform b0 at least c0 + 1 times at some point since this happens in
h′. Let j1 be committed to synchronize on action b1 6= b0 when the play stops in
h and suppose he has already synchronized c1 times on b1 before this point. We
can now perform the same reasoning again to find a player j2 that has stopped
in h before reaching the point where he is ready to synchronize on b1 for the
(c1 + 1)th time. At this point he is committed to performing the action b2 for
the (c2 + 1)th time. This reasoning gives us an infinite sequence ji of players
committed to actions bi in the last state after having performed the action bi
exactly ci times before.
We now introduce a partial order⊆ (Act×N)2 on elements (a, d) ∈ (Act×N)
such that there exists j so action a occurs at least d times in h′. The relation is
defined such that (a, d)  (a′, d′) if there is a player j such that a occurs d times
on h′ before a′ occurs d′ times on h′ (and a′ actually does occur d′ times at some
point on h′). It is reflexive and transitive because all players that has an action
in their alphabet must commit in order to synchronize on it. Anti-symmetry
follows from this and the fact that ρj is linear for every j.
Now, we have that (bi+1, ci+1) ≺ (bi, ci) for all i ≥ 0. This is the case firstly
because πji(h) is a prefix of πji(h
′) for the players giving rise to the sequence of
bi’s. Secondly, because bi+1 6= bi. This means that
(b0, c0) ≻ (b1, c1) ≻ (b2, c2)...
is an infinite strictly decreasing sequence. Since ≻ is only defined on a finite
number of elements this gives a contradiction. Thus, |πj(h)| = |πj(h′)|. Further,
πj(h) = πj(h
′) since one is a prefix of the other. Since j was chosen arbitrarily,
this means that the local history πj(h) before the delay transition cannot be
changed by any scheduler and is uniquely determined by the pure strategies.
From this, the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
We now extend to arbitrary events in I by applying the result above. How-
ever, first we need some notation. If H = s0c0
a1,I1
−−−→ s1c1 · · ·
ak,Ik−−−→ sk is
an interval-timed history then the set of histories h ∈ [H ] with specific delays
d1, ..., dv on the delay transitions is denoted [H ]
d1,...,dv . Note that this set is
finite.
Lemma 2 Let E ∈ I, s0 ∈ S, σ = (σ1, ..., σn) be a pure strategy profile and
δ, δ′ be two schedulers. Then
Prσ,δ
s0
(E) = Prσ,δ
′
s0
(E)
Proof. We show this by showing that for every time-abstract cylinder Cylia(H)
for an interval-timed history H = s0c0
a1,I1
−−−→ s1c1 · · ·
ak,Ik−−−→ sk such that
ak ∈ Plr if k > 0, every pure strategy profile σ and every pair δ, δ′ of schedulers
we have
Prσ,δ
s0
(Cylia(H)) = Prσ,δ
′
s0
(Cylia(H))
First, for any scheduler δ we have
Prσ,δs0 (Cyl
ia(H)) =
∑
H′∼H
Prσ,δs0 (Cyl(H
′))
since these cylinder sets are disjoint.
Suppose that ai ∈ Plr for the indices α1, ..., αv and ai ∈ Act for the indices
β1, ..., βu. For 1 ≤ i ≤ v, let ℓi = inf(Iαi) and ui = sup(Iαi ). Next, consider fixed
delays d1, ..., dv and let [H ]
d1,...,dv = {h1, ..., hr}. For 1 ≤ m ≤ r we denote
hm = sm0 c
m
0
am1 ,t1−−−→ s
m
1 c
m
1 · · ·
amk ,tk−−−−→ s
m
k
where the timestamps ti are induced by the delays d1, ..., dv on the delay
transitions. Now, since every interval-timed history H ′ ∼ H contains the same
intervals and same delay transitions we have
Prσ,δ
s0
(Cylia(H))
=
∑
H′∼H
Prσ,δ
s0
(Cyl(H ′))
=
∫ u1
ℓ1
...
∫ uv
ℓv
∏
1≤i≤v
Q(smαi , s
m
αi+1) · e
−E(di)
·
∑
hm∈[H]d1,...,dv
( ∏
1≤i≤u
δ(hm≤βi−1, c
m
βi−1)(a
m
βi)
·
∏
0≤i<k
∏
j∈Sync(am
i
)
σj(πj(h
m
≤i))(c
m
i (j))
)
ddv · · ·dd1
We will now show by induction on v that for any fixed delays d1, ..., dv
pd1,...,dv =
∑
hm∈[H]d1,...,dv
( ∏
1≤i≤u
δ(hm≤βi−1, c
m
βi−1)(a
m
βi)
∏
0≤i<k
∏
j∈Sync(am
i
)
σj(πj(h
m
≤i))(c
m
i (j))
)
either equals 0 or 1 independently of the scheduler δ. This implies that
Prσ,δs0 (Cyl
ia(H)) is independent of the scheduler and thus proves the lemma.
For the base case suppose that v = 0. Then the only possibility is H = s0
since H cannot end with an action transition. In this case it is immediate that
pd1,...,dv = 1.
For the inductive case suppose that v > 0 and that it holds for all H ′ with
less than v delay transitions. Note that sαv−1 is the same state for every h ∈
[H ]d1,...,dv . Thus, we have [H ]d1,...,dv = {h · h′ | h ∈ [H≤αv−1 ]
d1,...,dv−1 and h′ ∈
[H≥αv−1 ]
dv}. That is, the set of histories in [H ]d1,...,dv is obtained by gluing
together every prefix up to sαv−1 with every suffix starting in sαv−1 . For two
histories hm and hn in these two sets we denote their concatenation (where final
state of hm is merged with initial state of hn) by hmn. This gives us
pd1,...,dv =
∑
hm∈[H≤αv−1 ]
d1,...,dv−1
∑
hn∈[H≥αv−1 ]
dv
(
∏
i:βi<αv−1
δ(hm≤βi−1, c
m
βi−1)(a
m
βi)∏
0≤i<αv−1
∏
j∈Sync(am
i
)
σj(πj(h
m
≤i))(c
m
i (j))
∏
i:βi>αv−1
δ(hmn≤βi−1, c
mn
βi−1)(a
mn
βi )
∏
αv−1≤i<αv
∏
j∈Sync(amni )
σj(πj(h
mn
≤i ))(c
mn
i (j))
)
=
∑
hm∈[H≤αv−1 ]
d1,...,dv−1
·
∏
i:βi<αv−1
δ(hm≤βi−1, c
m
βi−1)(a
m
βi)
·
∏
0≤i<αv−1
∏
j∈Sync(am
i
)
σj(πj(h
m
≤i))(c
m
i (j))
·
∑
hn∈[H≥αv−1 ]
dv
( ∏
i:βi>αv−1
δ(hmn≤βi−1, c
mn
βi−1)(a
mn
βi )
∏
αv−1≤i<αv
∏
j∈Sync(amn
i
)
σj(πj(h
mn
≤i ))(c
mn
i (j))
)
If we can show that the second sum is either 0 or 1 independently of the
scheduler then we can apply the induction hypothesis on the remaining part.
Note that no player can distinguish between the prefixes hm since they are in
the same equivalence class. Thus, using pure strategies the players can only
base their decision on what happens after reaching smnαv−1 . Now, using the same
technique as in the proof of Lemma 1 the result follows. ⊓⊔
From Lemma 2 we know that the probabilities of events in I are independent
of the scheduler when the strategy profile is pure. Using this we can show that
this is also the case for non-pure strategy profiles. The idea of the proof is similar
to the proof of Kuhn’s Theorem 3 behavioural strategies are shown equivalent in
perfect recall extensive-form games. This intuition is applied in the 0-duration
subhistories.
3 H. W. Kuhn, ”Extensive games and the problem of information,” Annals of Mathe-
matics Studies, vol. 28, 1953
Theorem 1. Let E ∈ I, let s0 ∈ S be a state, let σ = (σ1, ..., σn) be a strategy
profile and δ, δ′ be two schedulers. Then
Prσ,δ
s0
(E) = Prσ,δ
′
s0
(E)
Proof. We show this by showing that for every time-abstract cylinder Cylia(H)
for an interval-timed history H = s0c0
a1,I1
−−−→ s1c1 · · ·
ak,Ik−−−→ sk such that
ak ∈ Plr if k > 0, every strategy profile σ and every pair δ, δ′ of schedulers we
have
Prσ,δ
s0
(Cylia(H)) = Prσ,δ
′
s0
(Cylia(H))
We use the same notation as in the proof of Lemma 2. Again we have
Prσ,δ
s0
(Cylia(H))
=
∫ u1
ℓ1
...
∫ uv
ℓv
∏
1≤i≤v
Q(smαi , s
m
αi+1) · e
−E(di)
·
∑
hm∈[H]d1,...,dv
( ∏
1≤i≤u
δ(hm≤βi−1, c
m
βi−1)(a
m
βi)
·
∏
0≤i<k
∏
j∈Sync(am
i
)
σj(πj(h
m
≤i))(c
m
i (j))
)
ddv · · ·dd1
For fixed delays d1, ..., dv we will show that a discrete probability distribution
over a finite set of pure strategies gives rise to the same probability as above.
As this is independent of the scheduler by Lemma 2 so is the probability for the
mixed strategies. As this holds for all delays, the Theorem follows.
Now, for each history hm ∈ [H ]d1,...,dv we define a pure strategy profile σh
m
that plays according to hm as well as a probability ph
m
defined by
ph
m
=
∏
0≤i<k
∏
j∈Sync(am
i
)
σj(πj(h
m))(cmi (j))
If p =
∑
hm∈[H]d1,...,dv p
hm < 1 then define a pure strategy σ′′ that plays
such that a h ∈ [H ]d1,...,dv is not possible. Further, define pσ
′′
= 1 − p. Now,
consider the experiment of using scheduler δ and picking either one of the strat-
egy profiles σh
m
with probability ph
m
or σ′′ with probability pσ
′′
and applying
these strategies. The probability that a prefix of the play is in [H ]d1,...,dv in this
experiment is independent of the scheduler because of Lemma 2. We will show
that it is in fact equal to Prσ,δs0 (Cyl
ia(H)). Indeed, the probability is
∑
σhm
ph
m
∑
hm∈[H]d1,...,dv
·
( ∏
1≤i≤v
Q(smαi , s
m
αi+1) · e
−E(di)
·
∏
1≤i≤u
δ(hm≤βi−1, c
m
βi−1)(a
m
βi)
·
∏
0≤i<k
∏
j∈Sync(am
i
)
σh
m
j (πj(h
m
≤i))(c
m
i (j))
)
=
∏
1≤i≤v
Q(smαi , s
m
αi+1) · e
−E(di)
·
∑
hm∈[H]d1,...,dv
(
ph
m
·
∏
1≤i≤u
δ(hm≤βi−1, c
m
βi−1)(a
m
βi)
)
By inserting the expression for ph
m
the result follows. ⊓⊔
C Full proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. For a DEC-POMDP P with n players and target set T we can
construct in polynomial time a distributed IMC G with n+1 players and target
set T ′ such that
∃σ : PrσG (⋄T ) = p ⇐⇒ ∃σ
′ : Prσ
′
P (⋄T
′) = p.
Proof. Let us fix a DEC-POMDP P = (S,Plr, (Acti)1≤i≤n, δ, (Oi)1≤i≤n, O, sin)
with n players Plr = {1, ..., n}. Further, let Acti = {ai1, ..., aimi} and Oi =
{oi1, ..., oiℓi} for player i ∈ Plr. The distributed IMC G has n + 1 modules,
one module for each player in P and the main module responsible for their
synchronization. Intuitively,
– the module of every player i stores the last local observation in its state
space. Every step of P is modelled as follows: The player outputs to the
main module the action it chooses and then inputs from the main module
the next observation.
– The main module stores the global state in its state space. Every step of P
corresponds to the following: The main module inputs the actions of all play-
ers one by one, then it randomly picks the new state and new observations
according to the rules of P based on the actions collected. The observations
are lastly output to all players, again one by one. The main module is con-
structed so in every state there is at most one action transition. Thus, there
is only one trivial strategy that cannot influence anything.
The construction of module for player i ∈ {1, ..., n} is illustrated in Figure 4
along with constructions for input and output. The interesting part is the in-
putting mechanism. Inputting an action from the set {a1, . . . , ar} when in a
state s is done as follows. Instead of waiting in s, the player travels by delay
transitions in a round-robin fashion through a cycle of r states, where in the
i-th state, only the action ai is available. This way, the player cannot influence
anything and must input the action that comes with probability 1.
m
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le
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Fig. 4: Module for player i on the left. Input and output encoding to the right.
In the same fashion, the main module is constructed such that the extra
player n+ 1 has at most one possible choice in each state and thus, this player
controls nothing except what he is forced to do by the structure of his module.
Thus, he has no choice but to enforce the rules of P in G. In the main module the
current state s of the DEC-POMDP P is remembered at all times. Player n+1
then goes through n steps inputting an action for each player. These are saved in
the state of the module as well. When all actions have been collected, a random
choice according to δ is made. This determines the successor state s′. Afterwards,
a random choice of observations for the different players is done according to O.
Then, these observations are outputted to the other players again in a sequence
of n steps. The play proceeds for an infinite number of rounds, thereby modelling
the DEC-POMDP.
The initial global state in G is known to all players and each initial local
state is left one by one as the players output their first action. In addition,
s0(n + 1) = s
in as the main module mimics P . The target set T ′ in G is given
by all global states such that the main module is in a state corresponding to a
state in T .
Since none of the players can affect the timing in the distributed IMC created
(they always need to choose actions immediately and are never allowed to re-
decide) none of them can gain any information that was not already there in the
DEC-POMDP. Therefore, there exists a strategy profile σ in P with PrσP(⋄T ) =
p if and only if there exists a strategy profile σ′ in G with Prσ
′
G (⋄T
′) = p. Note
that this is also the case since there is never more than one enabled action at a
time in the main module. Thus, player n+ 1 does not have any influence. ⊓⊔
D Full proof of Theorem 3
Proposition 3. The qualitative existence problem for DEC-POMDPs with n ≥
2 players is undecidable.
Proof. We do a reduction from the non-halting problem of a deterministic Turing
machine M = (Q, q0, Σ,∆,B, F ) that never writes the blank symbol B and
starts with a blank input tape. Further, it never moves to the left of the initial
state. Here, Q is the finite set of control states, q0 is the initial state, Σ is
the tape alphabet, ∆ : Q × Σ → Q × Σ × {L,R} is the transition function
and F is the set of accepting states. From M we construct a DEC-POMDP
P = (S, {1, 2}, (Act1,Act2), δ, (O1,O2), O) with two players Plr = {1, 2} such
that M does not halt if and only if player 1 and 2 have strategies σ1 and σ2 such
that the probability of reaching a target set T ⊆ S is 1. The overall structure of
P can be seen in Figure 5 but without the details of the sub-module P ′.
s0
s1
s2
s3
s4
sf
P ′s5 s6
(n, n)
1
3
1
3 1
3
(n, n)
1
3
1
31
3
(q0, q0)
(#,#)
⋃
a∈Act\{#}
{(a, a)}
(#,#)
⋃
a∈Act\{#}
{(a, a)}
Fig. 5: Overall structure of P without the details of P ′.
In this game, both players have two possible observations. In all states except
s1, s3, s4 player 1 receives one observation (illustrated with top-half of states filled
with black) and in all other states he will receive another observation (top-half
of states being white). Player 2 gets one observation for states s1, s4 as well as
in some states in P ′ (when bottom-half is black). In all other states he receives
another observation.
The play starts in s0 and with probability 1 either each player will receive
the black observation exactly once during the game or the play will go to sf ∈ F
from s2 at some point. If the play goes to s1 or s4 the players will receive the
observation at the same time and if the play goes to s3 then player 2 will receive
the observation in the next state. We will show that in order to have strategies
σ1, σ2 that can make sure to reach the target set with probability 1 two things
must be satisfied
1. σi must prescribe playing the jth configuration of the Turing machineM (in
a format described below) if player i ∈ {1, 2} receives the black observation
in the jth step after the play leaves s0
2. M does not halt
Further, when these two properties are satisfied, players 1 and 2 can indeed
reach the target set with probability 1 by applying σ1 and σ2. We now explain
what we mean by playing a configuration of M . Let (q, w, j) ∈ Q × Σ∗ × N be
a configuration of M where q is the current control state, w is the current non-
blank part of the tape contents and j is the current position of the tape head. By
playing configuration (q, w, j) we mean playing the following sequence of actions
(where possible actions are corresponding to control states, tape symbols and #
as an end of non-blank tape marker)
w1w2...wj−1qwjwj+1...w|w|#
In other words, the contents of the tape is played one symbol at a time and the
control state is prior to contents of the tape cell that the tape head points to.
The DEC-POMDP P is constructed such that
1. If the play goes to s1 both players must play the first configuration of M
2. If the play goes to s4 both players must play the same sequence of symbols
and ending with a #
3. If the play goes to s3 the two players must play configurations C1 and C2
respectively such that C2 is a successor configuration of C1 according to the
transition function of M . Further, this must be done with an offset of 1 step
because player 2 receives the black observation one step later than player 1.
Finally, the play will go to a sink state if they play a halting state as part
of the configurations, making it impossible to reach T afterwards. This can
be done with a finite module P ′ [5].
By induction we can show that if player 1 and 2 have strategies σ1 and σ2 to
ensure reaching T with probability 1 then they must play the jth configuration
of M if receiving the black observation in the jth step after the play leaves
s0. Indeed, if one of the players gets the black observation for j = 1 then s1
is a possible state. Thus, both players must play the first configuration when
j = 1. Now, suppose as induction hypothesis it is true for some j. Now, if player
2 receives the black observation in the (j + 1)th step then the play might have
passed through s3 in which case player 1 will have received the black observation
in the jth step. Thus, to make sure to reach T in this case player 2 must player
a successor configuration of what player 1 plays. Thus, player 2 must play the
(j+1)th configuration of M when getting the black observation in the (j+1)th
step. Now, if player 1 gets the black observation after j + 1 steps, then it is
possible that the play is in s4. If this is the case then player 2 will also have
received the black observation in the (j+1)th step. Since player 2 will then play
the (j + 1)th configuration of M then player 1 has to do this as well in order
to reach T since the players must play the same sequence of symbols to reach T
from s4. This concludes the induction step.
We have now shown that if player 1 and 2 have strategies σ1 and σ2 to ensure
reaching T with probability 1 then they must play the jth configuration of M
when receiving the black observation in the jth step after the play leaves s0. We
now need to show that if M does not halt, then applying these strategies will
actually ensure reaching T with probability 1 and if M does halt, then applying
these strategies will not ensure reaching T with probability 1 (and thus, in this
case, no strategies can ensure this).
In the case where M does not halt, the play will reach sf , s1, s3 or s4 with
probability 1. Suppose it reaches s1, s3 or s4 at step j. Then both players play
the appropriate configuration and reach T with probability 1 since none of them
will play a halting state at any point.
Suppose on the other hand thatM halts after j steps. Now the play will reach
s4 after j steps with positive probability. And since the players using σ1 and σ2
play the jth configuration ofM when this happens, they will play a halting state
with positive probability. Thus, they cannot ensure reaching T with probability
1 in this case.
In total this means the players have strategies to reach T with probability 1
if and only if M does not halt. ⊓⊔
E Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2. The value of G equals to the value of MG , i.e.
sup
σ
Prσ(⋄T ) = sup
π
Prπ(⋄T ).
The proof goes by three technical steps. First we define a stronger class of
synchronization strategies that can observe the whole global state whenever in a
synchronization state that have the same power as the strategies inMG . Second,
we show that any strategy profile can be mimicked by a synchronization strategy.
The crucial step is the third. We show how any synchronization strategy can be
(up to an arbitrary error) emulated by standard strategies in a distributed IMC.
These strategies obtain (with high probability) full-observation by delaying.
E.1 Synchronization strategies
A global strategy is a measurable function θ : Hist → ∆(C) that takes new
choices only when allowed, i.e. that for any global history h of the form h =
h′ · c a,t−−→ s and any global choice c
′ such that θ(h)(c′) > 0 we have c(j) = c′(j)
if j 6∈ Sync(a). For this section, we call standard strategies local to stress the
difference.
Furthermore, we call a global strategy a synchronization strategy if it, in-
tuitively, disregards non-local knowledge after the last synchronization state.
Formally, the following condition needs to be satisfied for any pair of global his-
tories h and h′ and any player j ∈ {1, 2}. Let h = h1 · s · h2 and h
′ = h′1 · s
′ · h′2
where h2 and h
′
2 are the sequences after the last visit of a synchronization state (s
and s′). If (1) h1 ·s = h′1 ·s
′, and (2) πj(h2) = πj(h2), we have θ(h)(c) = θ(h
′)(c)
for any c ∈ Cj where θ(h)(c) :=
∑
c,c(j)=c θ(h)(c).
Note that a synchronization strategy replaces a complete profile of local
strategies. The definition of the probability measure Prθ,δs0 induced by a synchro-
nization strategy θ and a scheduler δ goes along the same lines as for a strategy
profile. The only difference is that we replace the term Sti by the much simpler
term St′i = θ(hi)(ci). By observing the whole synchronization state the strategy
θ can completely avoid that a scheduler δ has any power. Indeed, the strategy θ
can make sure that En(s) always contains at most one action. Similarly to local
strategies, we thus simplify the notation by denoting the probability measure
Prθ
s0
.
Lemma 1. The value of G w.r.t. synchronization strategies equals to the value
of MG:
sup
π
Prπ(⋄T ) = sup
θ
Prθ(⋄T )
Proof. Ad ≤: We show that an optimal pure memoryless strategy π induces
a synchronization pure memoryless strategy θ with the same value. Let h be a
history in G. This gives us a history h¯ in the MDP (by removing choices, actions,
time, and all private states). Further, let (c, σ1, σ2) = π(h¯) be the decision of π.
– If last(h) is a synchronization state, θ takes the choice c (maybe step by step
as the choice of each player can be changes only after the player moves).
– If last(h) is a private state and the player j ∈ {1, 2} needs to take an action,
we distinguish two cases:
• if last(h)(j) is a private state, player j takes action according to the pure
memoryless strategy σj ;
• if last(h)(j) is a synchronization state, player j chooses ∅j .
The equality Prπ(⋄T ) = Prθ(⋄T ) can be easily shown by induction in the number
of visits to synchronization states. The crucial fact is that the probability to reach
in G by θ a state (s′1, s
′
2) ∈ S
′ from a state (s1, s2) ∈ S′ only via S \ S′ coincides
with P ((s1, s2), π((s1, s2)))(s
′
1, s
′
2).
Ad ≥: For a global history h · (s1, s2), we denote by Pr
θ
h·(s1,s2)(⋄T ) the prob-
ability to reach T with θ after history h · (s1, s2) has already passed. We show
the statement in three steps.
First we argue that
sup
θ
Prθh·(s1,s2)(⋄T ) = sup
θ
Prθh′·(s1,s2)(⋄T )
for any histories h · (s1, s2) and h′ · (s1, s2) ending in the same synchronization
state. Let us assume that for some θ′ we have that Prθ
′
h·(s1,s2)(⋄T ) is strictly
greater than the value for h′(s1, s2). Since only the last synchronization state
has impact on the further evolution, we could define a strategy θ′′ to play in
h′ · (s1, s2) in the same way as θ′ plays in h · (s1, s2). This way, we get the same
reachability probability yielding a contradiction.
Second, we can thus define the value of a synchronization state (s1, s2) simply
as
val(s1, s2) = sup
θ
Prθ(s1,s2)(⋄T )
and we can easily obtain equations
val(s1, s2) = sup
θ
∑
(s′1,s
′
2)∈S
′
Prθ(s1,s2)(R(s
′
1, s
′
2)) · val(s
′
1, s
′
2).
where R(s′1, s
′
2) are the plays that reach (s
′
1, s
′
2) via states in S \ S
′. Because a
synchronization strategy needs to play in each such fragment exactly as a profile
of local strategies, it is in turn equal to
= sup
(σ1,σ2)
∑
(s′1,s
′
2)∈S
′
Pr
(σ1,σ2)
(s1,s2)
(R(s′1, s
′
2)) · val(s
′
1, s
′
2)
which can be decomposed to two independent one-player games
= sup
σ1,σ2
∑
(s′1,s
′
2)∈S
′
Prσ1s1 (R(s
′
1)) · Pr
σ2
s2 (R(s
′
2)) · val(s
′
1, s
′
2).
Each such one player game is equivalent to a continuous-time Markov decision
process where any achievable vector of (time-unbounded) reachability probabili-
ties of terminal states can be equivalently achieved in the embedded discrete-time
Markov chain. The set of achievable vectors of reachability probabilities forms a
polytope with the corners given by pure memoryless strategies. One can easily
see that the supremum above is always obtained for some corners of the two
polytopes, i.e. for pure memoryless strategies. ⊓⊔
E.2 Proof of ≤:
We show that for every profile σ of local strategies there is a synchronization
strategy θ such that
sup
σ
Prσ(⋄T ) ≤ Prθ(⋄T )
The proof follows from the fact that for a profile σ of local strategies there is
a synchronization strategy θ inducing equivalent probability measures. Indeed,
for decisions of every player i the synchronization strategy disregards the global
knowledge and decides only based on the ith local projection of the history
exactly as σi.
E.3 Proof of ≥:
Finally, we show that using the optimal strategy π′, we can define a sequence of
local strategy profiles σ1,σ2, . . . such that
lim
i→∞
Prσ
i
(⋄T ) = Prπ
′
(⋄T ).
Let us fix i ∈ N. In order to define the strategy profile σi, we need some
auxiliary notions. We assume w.l.o.g. that S′1 = {0, . . . , |S1| − 1} and S
′
2 =
{0, . . . , |S2| − 1}. Let λ be the minimal rate of the delay transition over all
synchronization states of both players and Ki be the minimal integer such that
e−λKi ≤ 1/(4i · (|S′1| + |S
′
2|)). We split for each count of synchronization steps
k ∈ N0 the time into phases of length |S′1| · 2|S
′
2| · (Ki + k/λ) each composed of
|S′1| · 2|S
′
2| slots of length ℓi,k = (Ki + k/λ). For any t ∈ R we define functions
– rowi,k(t) := ⌊t / 2|S′2| · ℓi,k⌋ mod |S
′
1|,
– coli,k(t) := ⌊t / ℓi,k⌋ mod 2|S′2|.
that give the current row and column in a synchronization table depicted in the
figure on page 14.
Let h be a history that includes k synchronization actions.
– Let h end in a synchronization state (s1, s2) at time t, and let the timed
guesses be s¯1 = rowi,k(t) and s¯2 = ⌊coli,k(t) / 2⌋. Furthermore, let (c
s¯1,s¯2
1 , c
s¯1,s¯2
2 )
be the optimal choices of π′ for players 1 and 2 in state (s¯1, s¯2). Finally, we
set a proposition sync to true iff coli,k(t) mod 2 = 0. We define for each
player (if the player is allowed to change the choice at the moment)
σi1(h) =
{
cs¯1,s¯21 if s¯1 = s1 and sync,
∅1 otherwise;
σi2(h) =
{
cs¯1,s¯22 if s¯2 = s2 and sync,
∅2 otherwise;
– If h ends in a private state (s1, s2), let t be the time of last synchronization.
We define again the timed guesses by s¯1 = rowi,k(t) and s¯2 = ⌊coli,k(t) / 2⌋.
Then σij plays in sj as the pure memoryless strategy σj chosen by the optimal
strategy π′ in state (s¯1, s¯2).
Lemma 7 For any i ∈ N we have
|Prπ
′
s (⋄T )− Pr
σ
i
s (⋄T )| ≤
1
i
.
Proof. Let us fix i ∈ N and k ∈ N0. From the definition of ℓi,k we have that the
probability erri,k that a choice is not updated within the length of one slot is
erri,k ≤ e
−λ(Ki+k/λ) ≤ e−λKi/2k ≤ 1/(4i · (|S1|+ |S2|) · 2
k).
Thus, the probability corr1i,k that the correct synchronization is achieved within
one phase is at least corri,k ≥ 1 − 2erri,k and the probability inco1i,k that an
incorrect synchronization is achieved within one phase is at most inco1i,k ≤ erri,k ·
(|S1| + |S2|) (here we bound it by the event that any synchronization choice is
not switched off within the next ¬sync slot). With the remaining probability
wait1i,k = 1− corr
1
i,k − inco
1
i,k, no synchronization is achieved within one phase.
The overall probability that the kth synchronization is incorrect is
incoi,k = inco
1
i,k ·
∞∑
j=0
(
wait1i,k
)j
≤ inco1i,k ·
∞∑
j=0
(
1− corr1i,k
)j
≤ erri,k · (|S1|+ |S2|) ·
∞∑
j=0
(2erri,k)
j ≤
1
2 · i · 2k
.
Therefore, the overall probability that any synchronization is incorrect is
∑∞
j=0 incoi,j ≤
1/i. It is easy to see that every profile σi emulates π′, provided every synchroniza-
tion guarantees that both players have correct knowledge of the other player’s
state. ⊓⊔
